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This paper investigates the border between formal employment, shadow employment, and unem-
ployment in an equilibrium model of the labor market with market frictions. From the labor
demand side, ﬁrms optimally create legal or shadow employment through a mechanism that is akin
to tax evasion. From the labor supply side, heterogeneous workers sort across the two sectors, with
high productivity workers entering the legal sector. Such worker sorting appears fully consistent
with most empirical evidence on shadow employment. The model sheds also light on the "shadow
puzzle", the increasing size of the shadow economy in OECD countries in spite of improvements
in technologies detecting tax and social security evasion. Shadow employment is correlated with
unemployment, and it is tolerated because the repression of shadow activity increases unemploy-
ment. The model implies that shadow wage gaps should be lower in depressed labor markets and
that deregulation of labor markets is accompanied by a decline in the average skills of the work-
force in both legal and shadow sectors. Based on micro data on two countries with a sizeable
shadow economy, Italy and Braziil, we ﬁnd empirical support to these implications of the model.
The paper suggests also that policies aimed at reducing the shadow economy are likely to increase
unemployment.
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Modern information technologies allowing to cross-check information coming from diﬀerent admin-
istrative sources and to quickly buildup and update inventories of bank accounts, make it relatively
easy to detect and repress shadow activity. However, this is not done and Governments’ statements
of “tolerance zero” vis-à-vis the informal sector do not seem to be taken too seriously by ﬁrms and
workers who continue to go underground. Indeed, the informal sector is ﬂourishing: available es-
timates point to an upward trend in the size of shadow economy in OECD countries from high
l e v e l s . T h es h a d o ws h a r eo fG D Pr a n g e sf r o mal o w1 0p e rc e n to fG D Pi nt h eN o r d i c s ,U Ka n d
Switzerland to peaks of 20 to 30 per cent in Southern Europe and Ireland and 40 per cent in
transitional economies of Eastern Europe and Asia.
Why is the informal sector so much tolerated? How do borders between shadow employment,
legal employment and unemployment evolve under diﬀerent macroeconomic conditions and insti-
tutional conﬁgurations? What does the reduction of the shadow sector imply in terms of labor
productivity?
In this paper we address these issues theoretically and empirically, and we oﬀer a simple expla-
nation of the "shadow puzzle": shadow employment and unemployment are two faces of the same
coin. Shadow employment is indeed correlated with unemployment. Based on macro, regional as
well as microdata in Italy and Brazil we ﬁnd clear evidence for this claim. Following this result, we
argue that shadow employment is tolerated because its repression increases unemployment, with
undesirable political consequences.
Our theory endogenises the choice of both, workers and ﬁrms, to go idle in an equilibrium
model of the labor market with market frictions. From the labor demand side, ﬁrms optimally
create legal or shadow employment through a mechanism that is akin to tax evasion. Being shadow
means not paying taxes (including social security contributions) and not being liable to severance
pay in case of a breakup of the employment relationship. However, there is a positive probability
that irregular employment is detected, in which case the match is immediately dissolved. From
the labor supply side, heterogeneous workers sort across the two sectors, with high productivity
workers entering the legal sector. Such worker sorting appears fully consistent with most empirical
evidence on shadow employment.
Repressing shadow employment, that is, increasing the detection probability, means increasing
1job destruction and reducing job creation in the shadow segment. While this repression tends to
increase total employment in the legal sector, it also increases unemployment. Available theories
of the informal sector — recently reviewed by Schneider and Enste (2000) — do not capture these
trade-oﬀs. This is because such theories take a partial equilibrium approach, focus either on labor
demand or on labor supply, and do not consider sorting of workers with varying productivity levels
in the two pools. Another distinguishing feature of our model is indeed that it self-selects workers
in the two pool endogenously, by determining the productivity threshold demarcating the two pools.
The model implies a positive correlation between unemployment and shadow employment that
is evident in cross country data as well as in regional data from Brazil and Italy, two countries
with large shadow employment. To ensure that such correlation is not a statistical artifact we
use a unique Brazilian data set where unemployment and shadow employment are two mutually
exclusive states, and we ﬁnd strong support for the positive correlation.
The model also implies that shadow wage gaps should be lower in depressed labor markets. We
ﬁnd empirical support also for this implication.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents few empirical regularities on shadow employ-
ment. Section 2 introduces and solves the model, obtaining the various equilibrium conﬁgurations.
Section 3 evaluates the comparative statics properties of the equilibria and provides some numeri-
cal simulations of the model. Section 4 assesses the empirical relevance of the model, drawing on
micro data from two countries with a large shadow pool, namely Brazil and Italy. Finally, Section
5b r i e ﬂy summarizes and concludes.
2 Shadow Facts
The consensus deﬁnition of the shadow economy is “all economic activities which contribute to
the oﬃcially calculated (or observed) gross national product, but escape detection in the oﬃcial
estimates of GDP” [Feige, 1989 and 1994; Lubell 1991 and Schneider 1994]. This deﬁnition
encompasses not only legal, but also illegal activities, such as trade in stolen goods, drug dealing,
gambling, smuggling, etc.. In this paper we conﬁne our attention to a subset of the shadow economy,
namely to legal activities. As is apparent from the above, our notion of shadow employment is
one of a lawful activity were it reported to tax authorities and subject to work regulations. We
focus on this (large) subset of the shadow economy as our aim is to contribute to the literature on
2the enforcement of labor regulations and to complement research on tax evasion, which has so far
overlooked the eﬀects of tax evasion and shadow employment on unemployment1.
Unfortunately, available estimates of the shadow economy do not disentangle legal from illegal
shadow economy and rarely provide measures of shadow employment. The methods being used
to measure the shadow economy either draw from direct inferences, that is surveys trying to elicit
involvement of respondents in unregistered activities or estimates based on tax audits, or from
indirect methods, which basically draw on the inconsistencies between diﬀerent statistical sources
in order to gauge the size of the underground economy. Among the latter methods, discrepancies
between national income and expenditure statistics or between physical input (mainly electricity
consumption) indicators of economic activity and oﬃcial GDP statistics or between changes in the
volumes of transactions and oﬃcial GDP-GNP growth or in terms of "excess" currency demand
(basically the residuals of a standard currency demand function), are the most frequently used.
All the above methods have pros and cons, and the wide variance of estimates being provided
is an indication of the limitations of these techniques. With these caveats in mind, let us brieﬂy
review the evidence on the size of the shadow economy, as also repeatedly summarized by Schneider
(2002,2003,2004).
There are two key ﬁndings which are conﬁrmed by all studies we are aware of.
The ﬁrst common denominator of these "consensus guesses" i sam a r k e du p w a r dt r e n di nt h e
size of the shadow economy. Figure 1 reproduces the (unweighted) average "shadow share" of GDP
in all OECD countries for which estimates, based on the same methodology, are available for a
relatively long-series. As revealed by the dotted lines (plotting one standard deviation above and
below the unweighted cross-country average), there is no sign that this trend has increased the
cross-country dispersion in the size of the shadow economy. The coeﬃcient of variation of the
shadow shares actually decreased from 1989-2000 to 2002-3 and there is not a single country with
a declining shadow share. The upward trend in the shadow share is consistent across methods:
it is found to hold not only in estimates based on currency demand, but also on the so-called
DYMIMIC method (dynamic multiple indicators multiple causes, Giles, 1999) which estimates a
set of structural equations within which the size of the shadow economy cannot be measured directly
and then uses this predicted structural dependence in estimating the size of the shadow economy.
Also estimates of the shadow economy in terms of headcounts point to an upward trend: Schneider
1See Burdett, Lagos and Wright (2000) for an analysis of the relationship between crime and unemployment.
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Figure 1: The upward trend of the shadow economy
(2000) estimated that in the European area the number of persons working in the unoﬃcial economy
doubled within the two decades from 1978 to 1998.
The second fact is the relatively low productivity of shadow jobs documented by studies relying
on micro-level data. In particular, Gonzaga (2003), Hoek (2004), Almeida and Carneira (2005),
drawing on data on the informal sector in Brazil, Lacko (2000), Bernabe (2005) and Commander
and Rodionova (2005), focusing on transitional economies, as well as Boeri and Garibaldi (2002)
and Brandolini and D’Alessio (2004), drawing on Italian data consistently document that workers
engaged in shadow employment have, on average, lower educational attainments than regular work-
ers and or hold jobs requiring unskilled workers. The way in which shadow jobs are identiﬁed in
4these studies may not be neutral with respect to the productivity content of jobs in the two pools.
However, the fact that low-skilled workers (or occupations) are represented in shadow employment
is consistent across alternative measures of shadow employment.
Table 2 displays the distribution of employment by educational attainment for shadow and
non-shadow segments of the labor force in Italy, according to diﬀerent data sources and deﬁnitions.
In particular, the top panel draws on Bank of Italy data and identiﬁes shadow employment by
looking at self-reported social security records: shadow employees are those who either reported to
have never paid social security contributions throughout their career (deﬁnition 1) or who report
the same number of months of contributions (deﬁnition 2) during the same employment spell
two years apart (which implies that they have not been paying contributions in between the two
interviews) 2.C l e a r l yd e ﬁnition 1 is more restrictive than deﬁnition 2. The mid-panel of Table 2
draws on labor Force Survey data and identiﬁes as shadow employees those individuals who are
employed according to internationally agreed, objective, deﬁnitions, but who deﬁne themselves as
non-employed. Finally, the bottom panel draws on data collected by an ad-hoc Istat-Fondazione
Curella survey carried out in Sicily in 1995 (Busetta and Giovannini, 1998). In this context, shadow
employement is identiﬁed in the individuals reporting to hold an irregular job, where irregular means
not paying social security contributions, understating the actual pay in order to pay lower taxes
and contributions or being altogether without a labor contract.
All data sources and measures of shadow employment suggest that workers with lower educa-
tional attainments are over-represented in the shadow pool.
Overall, shadow employment has mainly the characteristics of “marginal shadow employment’,
that is, employment in low productivity jobs, rather than “development shadow employment’, i.e.,
new jobs having the potential to become highly productive after some gestation period. In other
words, “infant industry” arguments cannot be applied to justify tolerance vis-á-vis the informal sec-
tor. We are looking for deeper and empirically more relevant (“development shadow employment”
seems to involves a tiny fraction of unregistered employment) explanations for the weak repression
of shadow employment.
2Clearly this second deﬁnition requires exploiting the longitudinal features of the Bank of Italy Survey. For a
description see Boeri and Brandolini (2004).
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a) Bank of Italy survey, average 1995-2002 
 












  ∆contrib=0  ∆contrib=0 + 
∆contrib <0  ∆contrib=2  No contribution 
at all 
At least 1 year 
of contribution 
Primary or lower  13.5  14.7  7.5  32.1  30.5 
Lower  secondary  35.4  33.6 27.8 31.5 27.7 
Lower vocational (3 years)  6.8  6.5  9.1  4.0  6.3 
Secondary  school  33.8  32.0 40.8 23.9 26.4 
Tertiary education  10.5  13.1  14.8  8.5  9.1 
 
 
                  b)LFS data, Italy average 1995-2002 
 
 Education  Shadow   Regular 
employment 
Primary or lower   38.4  15.0 
Lower secondary  25.6  36.1 
Lower vocational  (3 years)  4.3  7.8 
Secondary school  24.5  29.9 




            c) Istat-Fondazione Curella, Sicily 1995 
 
Education  Main job  Secondary job 






Primary  or  lower  24.0 13.5 19.5  8.8 
Lower  secondary    27.3 26.1 20.7 17.6 
Secondary  school  40.3 41.9 39.0 44.1 
Tertiary  education  8.4  18.4 20.7 29.4 
 
Figure 2: Shadow Employment by Educational Attainment of the Labor Force
63 A Two Sectors Model with Sorting
3.1 Shadow Employment and Worker’s Sorting
We consider an economy with a measure one of heterogenous workers and two sectors. The worker
type is indicated by x,w h e r ex refers to labor market productivity and its value is drawn from a
continuous cumulative distribution function F with support [xmin,xmax]. x is a ﬁxed time invariant
worker characteristic, with xmin > 0.
There are two sectors in the labor market: the regular sector and the shadow sector. The
gross value of production of each worker is indicated with px where p is a productivity component
common to all jobs and x is an idiosyncratic component. To keep the notation simple, we initially
assume that p =1 , and we consider changes in p in the numerical simulations. In the regular sector
ﬁrms pay a production tax τ in every period in which they employ a worker. In the shadow sector
the tax is evaded and there is an instantaneous monitoring rate equal to ρ. Conditional on being
monitored in the shadow sector, the shadow job is destroyed. Both regular and shadow jobs are
exogenously destroyed at rate λ3.
Firms can freely post a vacancy in either sector. We focus on single jobs, and each ﬁrm is made
of one job. Posting a vacancy in the regular sector costs kg per period while in the shadow sector
costs kb. There is free entry of ﬁrms in both sectors and the equilibrium value of a vacancy is driven
down to zero. Job creation characterizes the labor demand side of the model.
The labor supply is governed by the workers’ sorting behavior. Workers are endowed with a
unit of time and freely decide whether it is optimal to search and work in the shadow sector or
in the legal sector. Entering a sector is a full time activity, and workers can not simultaneously
work and/or search in both sectors. In the legal sector there is a speciﬁc unemployed income (the
unemployment beneﬁts) which is not available in the shadow sector.
Labor markets are imperfect, and there are market frictions in each sector. We follow the main
matching literature (Pissarides, 2000) and assume that the meeting of vacant jobs and unemployed
workers is regulated by a matching function with constant returns to scale. Diﬀerent matching
functions exist in diﬀe r e n ts e c t o r s .I nw h a tf o l l o w sw el e tw i t hvg and vb the number of vacancies
in both sectors, and ug and ub the number of unemployed job seekers. The matching function in
3In the simulations we also assume that conditional on λ striking, regular jobs need to pay a ﬁring tax T.
7each sector is indicated with
mi(ui,vi) i = g,b
with positive ﬁrst derivative and negative second derivative. As in the traditional matching models
with constant returns to scale, the transition rate depends on the relative number of traders and it
is indicated with θi = vi







) < 0, while the transition rate for workers is indicated with α
0i(θi)=θ
i
q(θi) with α0 > 0.
Successful matches in each sector enjoy a pure economic rent, and we let wages be the outcome
of a Nash bargaining problem, with workers getting a fraction β of the total surplus. We assume,
for simplicity, that β is identical in the two sectors.
We solve the model in three steps. First we present the value functions and the asset equations,
and deﬁne the key equilibrium conditions. Next, we solve the workers’ sorting behaviour in partial
equilibrium, taking as given job creation (the labor demand side of the model) and the transition
rate in each market. We then focus on job creation taking worker behaviour as given. Finally we
discuss the general equilibrium of the model, and we perform a set of numerical simulations.
3.2 Discussion
Before proceeding to the solution of the model, few important issues need to be discussed. Our
theory does not deal with the optimal enforcement of legal activity. Within the model, enforce-
ment takes place through the combination of random detection (the monitoring rate ρ)a n dﬁnite
punishment (in the form of job destruction). The inﬂuential analysis of Becker (1968) has shown
that, from the social welfare standpoint, it is always optimal to substitute a higher ﬁne for a lower
probability of detection, and that ﬁnes should be optimally set at their maximum level. In such
optimal enforcement setting, shadow employment would not be observed in equilibrium. While
the Becker argument is clear and convincing, we rarely observe such harsh punishment, possibly
because important market imperfections reduce the size of the optimal ﬁne. Davidson et al. (2004)
have recently shown that with capital market imperfections and/or asymmetric information, the
optimal ﬁne lies below the maximum level. Even though we do not explicitly take into account these
features, we believe that our realistic enforcement rule can be rationalized in such more complex
models, which are nevertheless left to further research.
The diﬀerence between legal and shadow jobs considered in the model focuses only on tax
compliance, and does not consider the possibility that jobs in the two sectors diﬀer along other
8important dimensions, such as capital intensity, health insurance, and ﬁrm sponsored training. In
reality, workers’ sorting decision takes probably into account of various job characteristics, and
there is evidence that legal jobs provide more training. We believe that it is technically possible to
provide such key extensions, without aﬀecting the main results of the paper.
Our model considers shadow employment as a full time activity and does not allow workers to
hold multiple jobs (i.e. a regular job alongside a shadow job). In terms of ﬂows, the model ignores
on the job search and direct transitions from shadow to legal employment without intervening
unemployment spells. Some of these features were considered by Boeri and Garibaldi (2002) in a
matching model with ﬁxed labor supply, without any scope for worker sorting, the key feature of
this paper.
3.3 Value Functions
The value of a ﬁlled job in the legal sector with productivity x reads
rJg(x)=x − wg(x) − τ + λ[V g − Jg(x)]
where τ is the tax rate, V g is the value of a vacancy and r is the pure discount rate. Jobs are
destroyed at the exogenous rate λ, and wg(x) is the wage rate.
Unemployment is a full time activity, and workers can not work in the shadow sector during an
unemployment spell. The value of unemployment in the legal sector for a worker of type x is
rUg(x)=b +αg(θ)[Wg(x) − Ug(x)]
where b is the speciﬁc unemployed income (the unemployment beneﬁts), and Wg(x) is the value of
the job for a type x. The value of a job in the legal sector is
rWg(x)=wg(x)+λ[Ug(x) − Wg(x)].
Posting vacancies in the legal sector is costly, and yields a per period return equal to −kg.
Conditional on meeting a worker, at rate qg(θg),t h eﬁrms gets the expected value of a job. In
formula, its expression reads
rV = −kg + qg(θg)[E [J(z) | z ∈ Ω]− V]
where the expectation is taken with respect to the productivity of workers that search in the legal
sector. The expression Ω refers to the support of workers that search in the legal sector.
9The value functions for jobs in the shadow sector are similarly deﬁned. The main diﬀerences
is that in the shadow sectors ﬁrms do not pay the production tax τ and the job is monitored and
destroyed at rate ρ. Further, there is no speciﬁc unemployed income b. The four value functions
read
rJb(x)=x − wb(x)+( λ +ρ)[V b − Jb(x)]
rWb(x)=wb(x)+( λ+ ρ)[Ub(x) − Wb(x)]
rUb(x)=αb(θb)[W b(x) − Ub(x)]








where Ωc is support of workers that search in the shadow sector.
Wages in each sector and in each job are the outcome of a bilateral matching problem and
workers get a fraction β of the total surplus so that
[Wi(x) − Ui(x)] = β[W i(x) − Ui(x)+Ji(x) − V i] i = b,g
f o rs i m p l i c i t yw eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tt h ef r a c t i o no ft h es u r p l u si st h es a m ei nb o t hs e c t o r s .
3.4 Equilibrium Conditions
There are three key equilibrium conditions
• Free entry and job creation in the legal sector (JCg), which implies that the value of a vacancy
be zero
V g =0
This equation will determine market tightness in the legal sector θg
• Free entry and job creation in the shadow sector (JCb), which implies that the value of a
vacancy be zero
V b = o
This equation will determine market tightness in the shadow sector θb
• Workers’ sorting (Sort). If we assume that workers’ sorting satisﬁes the reservation property,
(a feature that holds in equilibrium) the labor supply is described by the marginal worker
10with productivity R,w h e r eR is the productivity level for which the worker is indiﬀerent
between the two sectors, so that
Ug(R)=Ub(R)
Using the reservation property, the three key conditions are
















The ﬁrst condition says that the marginal worker is indiﬀerent between searching for a job in
the legal or the shadow sector. The second condition says that the total search costs in the legal
sector are identical to the expected value of a job. The last condition has a similar interpretation,
but refers to the shadow sector. The system determines the three endogenous variables θg,θb and
R
3.5 Stocks
The model is closed by determining the stock of workers into the four possible labor market states:
unemployment and employment in each of the two sectors. If we indicate with ui the stock of
u n e m p l o y e di ne a c hs e c t o ra n dw i t hni the stock of employed, we have
ug +ub + ng + nb =1
Workers’ sorting implies that the share of workers in the shadow sectors is F(R) while the remaining
1−F(R) workers search in the legal sector. Employed workers in the shadow sector lose their job at
rate λ+ρ while they ﬁnd jobs at a rate αb(θb) so that the balance ﬂow condition for unemployment
in the shadow sector is
αb(θb)ub =( λ +ρ)(F(R) − ub)














We are now in a position to formally deﬁne the equilibrium of the model.
Deﬁnition 1 Equilibrium. The equilibrium is obtained by a triple R,θg and θb and a vector of
stock variables that satisfy the value functions Ji,Wi,Ui,Vi (i = g,b), Nash Bargaining, and i)
Workers’ sorting, ii) Job Creation in the legal sector, iii) Job Creation in the shadow sector, iv)
balance ﬂow conditions.
3.6 Solving the worker’s sorting behavior
The surplus of a job in each sector is deﬁned as the sum of the worker’s and ﬁrm value of being on
the job, net of the respective outside options, so that
Si(x)=Ji(x) − V i + Wi(x) − Ui(x)
Using the value functions previously deﬁned, as well as the free entry condition (which drives the
value of a vacancy down to zero), the surplus of a match for a legal job with productivity x is
(r + λ)Sg(x)=x − τ − b − αg(θg)[W g(x) − Ug(x)]
Recalling that wages get a fraction β of the total surplus, the previous expression reads
Sg(x)=
x − τ − b
r +λ +βαg(θg)
with S0 = 1
r+λ+βθq(θ). Proceeding similarly, the surplus in the shadow sector is
Sb(x)=
x
r +λ +ρ +βαb(θb)
In partial equilibrium, the job ﬁnding rates ai are constant, and the surplus from the job is an
increasing linear function of the match speciﬁcp r o d u c t i v i t yx.
The surplus from the job can be used to obtain an expression for the value of unemployment,
whose expression is given by
Ub(x)=
αb(θb)βx
r + λ+ ρ+ βαb(θb)
Ug(x)=b +
αg(θg)β[x − τ − b]
r +λ +βαg(θg)
12Figure 3 shows the two value functions in partial equilibrium. The diﬀerences in the two curves
a r ed r i v e nb yt h ei n t e r c e p t( w h i c hi sn e g a t i v ei nt h el e g a ls e c t o r )a n dt h es l o p e .W em a k et w ok e y
a s s u m p t i o n si nt h i sr e s p e c t :
• Taxation is large enough relative to unemployment beneﬁts. We formally assume
that b(r + λ) <τα gβ. This implies that the intercept of Ug is negative in Figure 3.
• Monitoring is large enough. We formally assume that αgρβ+(r+λ)β(αg −αb) > 0. This
implies that the value function of Ug is steeper than Ub.
From the value functions, we can get an expression for the reservation productivity. The reser-
vation value R, if it exists, is the crossing point of the two lines. Its formal expression, when
considering αg and αb exogenous and constant is
R =
[ταgβ − b(r + λ)](r + λ+ ρ+ βαb)
αgρβ +(r +λ)β(αg − αb)
Existence in partial equilibrium requires R>0, and the two key assumptions above ensure
that R is positive. The equilibrium we are considering implies that shadow jobs are occupied by
workers with low skills, in line with the evidence discussed in Section 2 of this paper This is a key
premise of our theoretical analysis
Remark 2 Shadow jobs are occupied by relatively low skilled workers.
There are several results in the partial equilibrium setting, and are graphically obtained by
shifts and movements of the two lines
• An increase in unemployment beneﬁts reduces the reservation productivity R, so that more
people search in the legal market. At given job ﬁnding rates, an increase in unemployment
beneﬁts increases legal employment. This is the standard entitlement eﬀects of unemployment
beneﬁts, a labor supply phenomenon that was ﬁrst noted by Burdett and Mortensen (1982)
and Atkinson (1991) and recently received a lot of attention (Fredrikson and Holmlund, 2002;




(r +λ)(r +λ +ρ +βαb)








Figure 3: Workers’ sorting in partial equilibrium (with constant job ﬁnding rate)
• An increase in taxation increases shadow employment. This is the standard mechanism that
taxation moves away people from the regular sector into the shadow employment, as noted
by the work of Schneider (2002) and recently by Davis and Henrekson (2004). Formally, it is




αgβ(r + λ+ ρ+ βαb)
αgρβ +(r +λ)β(αg − αb)
> 0
• An increase in the monitoring rate reduces shadow employment. An increase in the moni-
toring rate reduces the return from shadow employment and induces people to search in the




[b(r + λ) − ταgβ]αbβ(r +λ +βαg)
[(r + λ)β(αb − αg) − αgρβ]2 < 0
3.7 Labor Demand and Job Creation
To solve for job creation we need to evaluate the expected value of a job. We ﬁrst focus on legal
jobs. After an integration by parts, and making use of the sharing rule, the integral in equation
14JCg can be written as
Z xu
R





R (1 − F(z))dz
r + λ+ βθgq(θg)
+
(1− F(z))[R − τ − b]
r + λ+ βθgq(θg)





R (1 − F(z))dz
1− F(R)
+[ R − τ − b] (1)
Proceeding similarly for the expected value of bad jobs, the free entry condition reads







Market tightness θi and the associated job ﬁnding rates αi depend on the various parameters, as
well as on the workers’ sorting behavior. Most parameters have a direct eﬀect on job creation, plus
an indirect eﬀect via the reservation productivity R.F o r m a l l y ,w ec a nw r i t e
αg(θg)=αg(R(.),b,r,λ,β))
αb(θb)=αb(R(.),ρ,λ,β))
where the symbol R() suggests that R is itself an endogenous variable. Some important comparative
static results follows
• An increase in the reservation productivity R increases market tightness and the job ﬁnding
rates in both sectors. An increase in R increases the average quality of the workforce in both
sectors, so that ﬁrms naturally respond by posting more vacancies per unemployed. This
result is important, and shows how sorting aﬀects job creation. Formally, it is obtained by
noting that ∂θg
∂R > 0 and ∂θb



























where the LHS is positive since q0 < 0.
• An increase in unemployment beneﬁts b, at given reservation productivity R, reduces job
creation in the legal sector. This is the standard adverse eﬀe c to fu n e m p l o y m e n ti n c o m eo n
job creation, an eﬀe c tt h a tw o r k sm a i n l yt h r o u g ht h ew a g er u l e .
15• An increase in taxation, at given reservation productivity R, reduces job creation in the legal
sector. This is also a textbook adverse labor demand eﬀect of taxation
• An increase in the monitoring rate ρ, at given reservation productivity R, reduces job creation
in the shadow sector. Higher monitoring rate acts as an increase in the destruction rate on
shadow jobs.
3.8 General Equilibrium
The general equilibrium of the model is obtained by solving for the triple R,θ g,θ b that simultane-
ously satisfy Sort JCb and JCg. One way to solve for the general equilibrium result is to consider
the workers’ sorting condition by explicitly considering the relationship between the job ﬁnding
rates and the reservation productivity. This is equivalent to solving
αb(R,.)βR
r +λ +ρ + βαb(R,.)
= b +
αg(R,.)β[R − τ − b]
r +λ +βαg(R,.)
(3)
where the expression αb(R,.) and αg(R,.) are consistent with the job creation conditions. Both
sides of the expression are increasing functions of R. The diﬀerence with respect to the partial
equilibrium result is that the expressions for the value of unemployment in equations (3) are no
longer simple linear function, but they are both increasing functions of R. To understand this,
consider the eﬀects of an increase in R on the value of unemployment in both sectors, there are two
eﬀects at work.
• First, there is a positive surplus eﬀect. This is analogous to the eﬀect analysed in partial
equilibrium. An increase in R increases the value of unemployment in both sectors, but has
al a r g e re ﬀect on the legal sector in light of the diﬀerence in the slope and the presence of ρ
in the shadow sector.
• Second, there a is a job creation eﬀect. An increase in R increases the job ﬁnding rate in
both sector, since the average value of the workforce increases.
As both eﬀects reinforce each other in a non linear fashion, multiple equilibria can not be ruled
out ex-ante. This should not be surprising, since multiple equilibria in matching models with double
heterogeneity are a standard feature (Albrecth and Vroman, 2002).








Figure 4: The General Equilibrium
Since both sides are increasing and non linear functions of R, there is no guarantee that the
equilibrium is unique.
In the simulations that follow, where we use a distribution for the productivity x that is negative
exponential, there is a unique equilibrium. In any case, if there were two equilibria, there would be
diﬀerent implications for the distribution of skills across the two sectors, with a perverse equilibrium
that implies that high productivity workers enter the shadow sector. In ﬁgure 4, the equilibrium
of point A is consistent with the skilled distribution that we highlighted in the comparative static
section. The feature of such an equilibrium can be described as follows
Ug(R∗)=Ub(R∗)
U0g(R∗) >U 0b(R∗)
where the second condition ensures that the value function of the legal sector is the steepest one
in the equilibrium point.
4 Simulations and Comparative Static
The comparative static results in the general equilibrium are not straightforward, since they combine
the eﬀect of each parameter on the labor demand and the labor supply of the model.
17Figure 5: General Equilibrium with Exponential Distribution
Consider the eﬀects of taxation. An increase in taxes tend to push jobs into the shadow sector,
and to decrease the value of each job. This is a standard result that reduces job creation. Yet,
the resulting increase in R improves the average quality of the workforce in the legal sector, with
a positive eﬀect on job creation. As a result, the total eﬀect on job creation may be ambiguous.
Consider an increase in the monitoring rate. On the one hand, it reduces R from the labor
supply standpoint and reduces job creation in the shadow sector. Both eﬀects reinforce each other,
and tend to reduce R. On the other hand, the reduction in R, by increasing the average productivity
of workers in the legal sector, feeds back on job creation in the legal sector, and tends to reduce R.
This suggests that an increase in the monitoring rate can reduce job creation in the good sector.
Similar logical arguments follow for the other comparative static exercise. The increase in
unemployment beneﬁts reduces (in partial equilibrium) the number of people in the shadow sector
by reducing R. The fall in R induces a feed back eﬀect on the average quality of the workforce in
the legal sector and, from the labor demand side, a reduction in job creation.
4.0.1 Baseline Speciﬁcation
T h eb a s e l i n es p e c i ﬁcation of the model is described in Table 1. With respect to the model presented
in the equations, the empirical speciﬁcation of the productivity is px,w h e r ex is the idiosyncratic
18component of productivity and p is an aggregate component. Further, in addition to a production
tax τ, the simulations consider also a ﬁring tax T, to be paid only in the legal sector conditionally
on a job separation (when the shock λ strikes).
The distribution is negative exponential. Figure 5 reports the diﬀerence between Ug(R)−Ub(R)
for diﬀerent values of the reservation productivity. The general equilibrium is described by the
crossing of such diﬀerence with the zero line. The ﬁgure clearly shows that there is a single crossing
and that the equilibrium is unique. The baseline parameterization is described and reported in
Table 1. Most parameters are standard in the literature (notably a 0.5 value for the bargaining
share and the matching elasticity). The search costs correspond to 25 percent of the value of the
labor product, a value that is roughly consistent with the structural estimates provided by Yashiv
(2000).
The shadow rate, deﬁned as the ratio between employment in the shadow sector and total
employment (including both ng and nb at the denominator) is around 14 percent. We perform
various comparative static exercises
19Table 1: Calibration
Parameters Notation Legal Shadow
Discount Rate r 0.03
Separation Rate λ 0.15 0.15
Unemployed Income b 0.10 0.00
Firing Tax F 0.10 0.00
Matching Elasticity ηi 0.50 0.50
Monitoring Rate ρ 0.00 0.06
Production Tax τ 0.20 0.00
Matching Function Constant Ai 0.50 0.50
Workers’ Surplus Share β 0.50 0.50
Common Productivity p 1.50 1.50
Search Costs ki 0.40 0.40
Equilibrium Values
Sorting Productivity R 0.24
Market Tightness θi 2.70 0.16
Job Finding Rate αi 0.82 0.28
Aggregate Statistics
Unemployment ui 12.10 7.52
Employment ni 66.23 14.15
Shadow Rate s 17.60
Average Wage wi 1.37 0.12
(a), Distribution is Exponential with parameter B =1.00
Source: Authors’ calculation
4.0.2 Changes in Aggregate Conditions
We study the eﬀects of the increase in p on the general equilibrium of the model. The results are
reported in Table 2. With the exception of p, all the other parameters are identical to those of
Table 1.
An increase in aggregate productivity increases employment and reduces unemployment in the
legal sector. Further, it reduces employment in the shadow sector. This is one of the key macro-
economic results of the paper. Unemployment and shadow employment are positively correlated
across diﬀerent states of the macroeconomy
• Remark 4 Unemployment and shadow employment are two faces of the same coin. Worse
aggregate conditions induce an increase in both unemployment and shadow employment (as
well as its shadow rate)
20Table 2: Changes in Aggregate Conditions
p R θb θg ub ug nb ng s xg xb wg wb
1.50 0.24 0.16 2.70 7.52 12.10 14.15 66.23 17.60 1.24 0.12 1.37 0.12
1.61 0.23 0.16 2.92 7.03 11.90 13.22 67.85 16.31 1.23 0.11 1.46 0.12
1.73 0.21 0.16 3.15 6.60 11.70 12.40 69.30 15.18 1.21 0.10 1.55 0.12
1.84 0.20 0.16 3.39 6.22 11.51 11.68 70.60 14.19 1.20 0.10 1.64 0.12
1.95 0.19 0.16 3.62 5.88 11.32 11.03 71.77 13.33 1.19 0.09 1.73 0.12
ug and ub are the unemployment rates respectively in the legal and shadow sector
ng,E nb, are respectively legal and shadow employment.
xg and xb are the average idyosincratic productivity in the legal and shadow employment
wg and wb are the average wages legal and shadow employment
Source: Authors’ calculation
The logic of this result can be expressed as follows. The increase in p tends to increase job
creation and market tightness. Simultaneously, the increase in p induces a fall in the marginal
productivity R, so that average quality worsens in both sectors. This tends to reduce job cre-
ation. The second eﬀect appears to be quantitatively more important in the legal sector, since the
productivity is proportional to x.
T a b l e2s h o w st h a tw a g ed i ﬀerentials between the legal and the shadow sector (the shadow wage
gap) are quantitatively more important when aggregate business conditions are good.
• Remark 5 Wage diﬀerentials should be larger in less depressed regions.
There are two adjustment mechanisms behind this result. First, a larger p directly aﬀects match
productivity inducing an increase in wages per any given x. Second, the rise in aggregate pro-
ductivity involves a reduction of the productivity threshold so that the average quality of matches
in both sectors decline. This tend to depress average wages in both sectors. As the aggregate
shock is multiplicative, its direct (positive) eﬀects on wages are quantitatively more important in
the legal sector than in the shadow sector, whilst the indirect eﬀects are nearly symmetric due to
the common threshold, R.
21Table 3: Changes in Total Taxation Conditions
τ R θb θg ub ug nb ng s xg xb wg wb
0.200 0.24 0.16 2.70 7.52 12.10 14.15 66.23 17.60 1.24 0.12 1.366 0.120
0.205 0.26 0.18 2.73 7.70 11.87 15.08 65.35 18.75 1.26 0.12 1.380 0.128
0.210 0.27 0.19 2.77 7.88 11.62 16.05 64.44 19.94 1.27 0.13 1.395 0.136
0.215 0.29 0.21 2.80 8.06 11.38 17.06 63.50 21.18 1.29 0.14 1.411 0.144
0.220 0.31 0.22 2.84 8.24 11.12 18.10 62.53 22.45 1.31 0.15 1.427 0.153
ug and ub are the unemployment rates respectively in the legal and shadow sector
ng,E nb, are respectively legal and shadow employment.
wg and wb are the average wages legal and shadow employment
Source: Authors’ calculation
Table 4: Changes in Firing Taxes
T R θb θg ub ug nb ng s xg xb wg wb
0.100 0.24 0.16 2.70 7.52 12.10 14.15 66.23 17.60 1.24 0.12 1.366 0.120
0.113 0.25 0.17 2.71 7.59 12.01 14.50 65.90 18.03 1.25 0.12 1.372 0.123
0.125 0.25 0.17 2.72 7.66 11.92 14.85 65.57 18.46 1.25 0.12 1.378 0.126
0.138 0.26 0.18 2.73 7.72 11.84 15.20 65.24 18.90 1.26 0.12 1.384 0.129
0.150 0.27 0.18 2.75 7.79 11.75 15.56 64.90 19.34 1.27 0.13 1.390 0.132
ug and ub are the unemployment rates respectively in the legal and shadow sector
ng,E nb, are respectively legal and shadow employment.
wg and wb are the average wages legal and shadow employment
Source: Authors’ calculation
4.0.3 Changes in Taxation and Regulations
We study the eﬀects of the increase in τ on the general equilibrium of the model. The results are
reported in Table 3. All the other parameters are identical to those of Table 1. More taxes and
regulations increase shadow employment and reduce legal employment. This is the standard result
of Schneider (2002). It is also consistent with the work of Davis and Henrekson (2005).
The eﬀect of taxation on unemployment is quantitatively very modest, since there are two
countervailing eﬀects at work. There is the indirect eﬀect on job creation via the increase in the
reservation productivity (reducing unemployment) plus the direct eﬀect of taxes on market tightness
in the legal sector (increasing unemployment).
C h a n g e si nr e g u l a t i o n( t h r o u g ht h eﬁring tax) are qualitatively analogous to the eﬀects of
taxation.
22Table 5: Changes in Monitoring Intensity
ρ R θb θg ub ug nb ng s xg xb wg wb
0.06 0.24 0.16 2.70 7.52 12.10 14.15 66.23 17.60 1.24 0.12 1.37 0.12
0.07 0.22 0.13 2.62 7.31 12.53 12.48 67.67 15.57 1.22 0.11 1.33 0.11
0.09 0.20 0.11 2.57 7.17 12.86 11.24 68.73 14.05 1.20 0.10 1.31 0.10
0.10 0.19 0.10 2.53 7.08 13.11 10.27 69.54 12.87 1.19 0.09 1.29 0.09
0.11 0.18 0.08 2.50 7.01 13.31 9.50 70.18 11.92 1.18 0.09 1.28 0.08
ug and ub are the unemployment rates respectively in the legal and shadow sector
ng,E nb, are respectively legal and shadow employment.
wg and wb are the average wages legal and shadow employment
Source: Authors’ calculation
4.0.4 Changes in the Monitoring Rate
We study the eﬀects of the increase in ρ on the general equilibrium of the model. The results are
reported in Table 5. An increase in monitoring intensity reduces the shadow rate, but it increases
unemployment
We view this result as extremely important, since it highlights one of the key reasons why gov-
ernments may be reluctant to repress the shadow sector. The associated increase in unemployment
is politically costly and thus avoided by utility maximizing politicians.
4.0.5 Changes in unemployed income
We now consider the eﬀects of an increase in b. An increase in unemployed income reduces the
shadow rate, and increases unemployment. Yet, the increase in participation in the legal sector
increases legal employment and reduces shadow employment. Note that market tightness falls in
both sectors.
The increase in unemployed income can be considered as a policy for uncovering (as opposed
to repression) shadow activities. Various diﬃculties are likely to exist in reality in enforcing this
policy (unemployment income requires larger taxation and very good monitoring). Yet, it can be
quite eﬀective.
23Table 6: Changes in Unemployed Income
b R θb θg ub ug nb ng s xg xb wg wb
0.100 0.24 0.16 2.70 7.52 12.10 14.15 66.23 17.60 1.24 0.12 1.366 0.120
0.104 0.24 0.16 2.67 7.46 12.20 13.85 66.49 17.24 1.24 0.12 1.360 0.118
0.108 0.24 0.15 2.65 7.40 12.29 13.56 66.75 16.88 1.24 0.11 1.355 0.116
0.111 0.23 0.15 2.63 7.34 12.39 13.27 67.01 16.53 1.23 0.11 1.349 0.113
0.115 0.23 0.15 2.61 7.27 12.49 12.97 67.27 16.17 1.23 0.11 1.343 0.111
ug and ub are the unemployment rates respectively in the legal and shadow sector
ng,E nb, are respectively legal and shadow employment.
wg and wb are the average wages legal and shadow employment
Source: Authors’ calculation
5 Empirical Relevance
Our model implies: i) a positive cross-sectional and time-series correlation between the size of the
shadow sector and unemployment (the two phenomena are just two faces of the same coin), ii) a
"shadow wage gap" that is larger in countries-regions and years in which unemployment is lower,
iii) a shadow employment that is increasing in taxation and labor market regulations, and iv) that
tighter monitoring increases unemployment. From a political economy perspective, the latter result
implies a lax enforcement of regulations in high-unemployment regions.
The purpose of this section is to evaluate the empirical relevance of i), ii) and iv). Implication
iii) is common to other models of the shadow economy and holds in many cross-sectional studies,
as reviewed by Schneider (2002).
5.1 Two faces of the same coin?
Figure 6 documents the correlation between the size of the shadow economy and the non-
employment rate across countries and Figure 7 across Italian regions, in both cases over average
period data. In particular, Figure 6 displays, on the vertical axis, the cross-country comparable
estimates of the shadow economy over GDP provided by Schneider (2004) and, on the horizontal
axis non-employment rates (unemployed and inactive as a fraction of the working age population)
obtained from harmonised Labour Force Survey (LFS) data. Regional non-employment rates
are also obtained from the (Italian) LFS, while the regional estimates of shadow employment are
drawn from Istat. The latter are provided in terms of full-time equivalents (ULA, "unità di lavoro
equivalenti") and are estimated building on the diﬀerence between survey-based employment and
24Figure 6: The Size of the Shadow Economy and Non Employment
employment levels, as computed on the basis of administrative (social security records) as well as
estimates of illegal employment of foreign workers4.
The correlation is striking in both cases: the cross-country correlation is .7 with a t-statistics
of 4.76; the cross-regional correlation is .94 with a t-statistics of 11.79. It holds also when shadow
employment is broken down by broad sectors, e.g., it is not a byproduct of the specialisation of
Southern regions in sectors (e.g., agriculture) where shadow employment is larger. There is also
no tendency over time to a reduction in regional diﬀerentials in shadow rates: they were in 1995
roughly as large as 10 years earlier.
Unfortunately, there are no long series of shadow employment and unemployment enabling to
assess their pairwise correlation over time. Figure 8 hints at co-movements between the shadow
rate and unemployment in Italy. The shadow rate initially rose with unemployment and then,
more recently declined together with unemployment.
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Figure 7: Shadow employment and unemployment across Italian regions
26Figure 8: Unemployment and Shadow Employment Over time in Italy
27All these correlations are consistent with the implications of our model and can be rationalized
by the fact that positive macroeconomic shocks or greater eﬃciency in a region increases job creation
and reduces the reservation productivity level at which jobs turn into formal jobs. However, given
t h es i z ea n ds t a t i s t i c a ls i g n i ﬁcance of correlations, one may think that they are a mere statistical
artifact, related to the way in which the two measures are deﬁned. As discussed in the Annex,
a spurious correlation may be induced between shadow employment and the unemployment rate,
when shadow employment is wrongly classiﬁed as unemployment by Labor Force Statistics. The
large unemployment rates observed also among prime-age men in Southern Italian regions suggest
that LFS data may indeed mis-classify jobs in the shadow sector. Unfortunately, estimates of
the shadow economy generally come from statistical sources which are silent on labor market
aggregates. When LFS data are used to measure shadow employment (e.g., as done in Table 2),
they either just scrap the surface of the phenomenon (the number are too small to achieve regional
representation) or concentrate only on the subset of shadow employment which is not mis-classiﬁed
by LFS statistics. Hence, there is no way to map shadow employment into the diﬀerent LFS
aggregates.
An important exception is the PME (Monthly Employment) survey carried out in six Brazilian
metropolitan areas since 1982. The survey design is similar to the CPS in the US and includes a
question on the payment of social security contributions. Following Almeida and Carneiro (2005),
Gonzaga (2003) and Hoeke (2005), we identify shadow workers as those individuals reporting to
work but stating that they do not have a social security card. It is a relatively large component
of the labor force: the shadow rate can be as high as roughly 1/3. By construction, these shadow
workers cannot be classiﬁed as unemployed. Figure 9 displays the yearly shadow and unemployment
rates in six Brazilian metropolitan areas since the inception of the survey. There is a remarkable
positive correlation (ranging from .31 in Rio to .82 in Salvador with t-statistics in the range 3.4 to
6.1). This correlation cannot be a statistical artifact, and provides genuine evidence of our empirical
implications.
5.2 The Shadow Wage Gap
Our model predicts that improvements in aggregate conditions increase the shadow wage gap.
Table 10 displays the shadow wage gap and a simple Oaxaca decomposition of this gap in Italy
over time and across two macro-regions characterised by very diﬀerent aggregate condition, such
28Figure 9: Shadow employment and unemployment in six Brazilian cities
as the North and the Mezzogiorno. In particular, drawing on the Bank of Italy SHIW we run two
standard wage regressions for the legal and the shadow sector (individuals stating that they are




















denotes average "personal-demographic" characteristics (educational attainments, gender,
age, family status, etc.) of sector "i" and βi the returns to these characteristics. Then we can
decompose the shadow wage gap as the sum of a diﬀerence in quantities (explained part) and




























An advantage of this decomposition is that it isolates the component which drives the changes
29Oaxaca Decomposition of the Shadow Wage Gap 
Shadow wage gap Explained Unexplained
All sample             1995 0.94 0.24 0.70
1998 0.79 0.40 0.39
2000 0.92 0.26 0.66
2002 1.04 0.23 0.81
North               all years 0.95 0.30 0.65
South               all years 0.78 0.31 0.48
Notes: Controls include age,gender,family status and educational attainments 
Source: Bank of Italy SHIW various years
Figure 10:
in the shadow wage gap according to our model: it is the unexplained (or diﬀerence in returns)
component, that is, the second term in equation (4). The decomposition is akin to the partial
equilibrium comparative statics exercise above, in that it assumes that diﬀerences in returns are
uncorrelated with changes in the characteristics of the two pools. It should be interpreted as an
approximation of the ﬁrst-round eﬀects of changes in the aggregate shock. Our exercise suggests
that the shadow gap has been widening since 1998, at times in which unemployment was declining,
and that it is larger in the dynamic North than in the depressed Southern labor markets. The key
factor behind these diﬀerences is the unexplained (returns) component of the gap.
Hoeke (2005) also reports an increase in the shadow wage gap in Brazil during cyclical upturns.
5.3 Enforcement
Modern information technologies allow tax administrations to easily collect and cross-check in-
formation from a variety of source. For instance, the Spanish tax administration built-up an
inventory of bank accounts which is particularly useful in tracking the shadow sector. The Italian
"Agenzie delle Entrate" is developing an inventory of electricity, gas, telephone and water bills of
contributors, which can be readily cross-checked with tax records.
There are plenty of anecdotes about poor enforcement in high-unemployment regions, although
it is very hard to document this. There are documents of the Italian Agenzia delle Entrate stating
that enforcement should be milder in small units and in agriculture, where shadow employment is
over-represented. Almeida et al. (2005) report a negative correlation between unemployment and
worksite inspections in Brazil. Broadly similar is the conclusions of the Osservatorio Veneto, al-
30though shadow employment in Veneto is very much related to immigration. A negative relationship
between shadow employment and monitoring is driven in our model by the eﬀects of controls on
job creation in the shadow sector. But there can also be political economy argument for observing
less repression of the shadow sector in high unemployment regions.
6F i n a l R e m a r k s
An equilibrium search model of the labor market, with workers’ sorting, contributes to explain
the "shadow puzzle", the increasing size of the shadow economy in OECD countries in spite of
improvements in technologies detecting tax and social security evasion. Our model has implications
which are broadly supported by the, admittedly scant, evidence on shadow labor markets. In
particular, we consistently ﬁnd a positive cross-sectional and time-series correlation between the
shadow rate and unemployment, and this correlation cannot be attributed to a statistical artifact.
Our model delivers also some policy implications. The most important is quite simple: in order
to reduce shadow employment, it is necessary to deregulate the labor market. Deregulation reduces
unemployment, and shadow employment is reduced as a by-product. In this context, the model
conﬁrms the traditional wisdom on labor market reforms, and suggests that any policy that fosters
job creation and enhances aggregate productivity will induce a reduction in shadow employment.
What about speciﬁc policies, aimed at discouraging the emergence of shadow activity? Our simple
theory suggests that a very cautious approach in this area is warranted, since an increase in the
monitoring rate may backﬁre: in equilibrium, higher monitoring reduces job creation, and increase
unemployment. Tight enforcement of entitlement rules to unemployment beneﬁts can be a better
option acting on the supply side (when unemployment beneﬁts are collected only by workers with
a regular employment history, and cannot be cumulated to income from shadow jobs, the workers’
incentive to enter the shadow sector are reduced) and hence has better job creation properties.
In further work we plan to investigate combinations of shadow and regular jobs, both in labor
demand and supply. Although this extension will signiﬁcantly increase the complexity of our
model, we are aware that the choice to go shadow is not merely a dichotomic choice. Multiple job
holding allows workers, for instance, to allocate hours across the two sectors. And ﬁrms can react
to idyosincratic productivity shocks by crossing borders between shadow and regular jobs.
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347.1 Annex
7.2 A statistical artifact?
According to the labor force statistics, the working age population is classiﬁed as Elf,U lf ,a n d
Nlf where the values refer respectively to labor force employment, unemployment and out of the
labor force. If the labor force is indicated with wap the function reads
Elf + Ulf +Nlf = wap




The oﬃcial istat deﬁnition of the shadow rate, s,i sg i v e nb yt h ee s t i m a t eo fs h a d o we m p l o y m e n t




The key issue concerns the relationship between Es and Elf or whether shadow employment
is part of the labor force employment. The answer depends on various assumptions regarding the
position of shadow employment in the labor force statistics
Assumption 1: shadow employment within the employment measured in the labor
force surveys.
This implies that




Es +Er + Ulf





In other words, an increase in shadow employment Es leads to an increase in the shadow rate and
to a decrease in the unemployment rate. The empirical correlation, in this case is not as t a t i s t i c a l
artifact
35Remark 6 If shadow employment is part of labor force employment, the correlation between s and
u is not a statistical artifact
Assumption 2: shadow employment is within the out of the labor force measured
in the labor force surveys.
This implies that
Nlf = ˜ N +Es










In other words, an increase in shadow employment leads to an increase in the shadow rate and has
no impact on the unemployment rate. Also in this case, the empirical correlation is not as t a s t i c a l
artifact.
Remark 7 If shadow employment is part of out of the labor force in labor force surveys, the
correlation between s and u is not a statistical artiﬁct
Assumption 3: shadow employment is within unemployment measured in labor
force surveys
This implies that
Ulf = ˜ U + Es
where ˜ U is a pure unemployment rate while Es is shadow employment. In this case the unemploy-
ment rate derived from labor force statistics is
ulf =
˜ U + Es
Elf + ˜ U +Es





36Remark 8 If shadow employment is part of labor force unemployment, the correlation between s
and u is a statistical artiﬁct
In this latter scenario one should try to correct the oﬃcial unemployment statistics. Is there
a fraction of unemployed people that looks suspicios? Unfortunately there is no mapping from
estimates of shadow employment to LFS deﬁnitions of employment, unemployment and inactivity.
In order to device some method to track the labor market status of shadow employment we need
to introduce some identifying restrictions. This requires some theoretical guidance.
37